


12/01/2016
Thursday

Gelfand-Pinsker WTC:



Product channel:

$$\begin{aligned} P[Y=y, Z=z | X=x, S=s] \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^n W_{Y,Z|X,S}(y_i, z_i | x_i, s_i) \\ &\triangleq W_{Y,Z|X,S}^n(y, z | x, s) \end{aligned}$$

Some additional Definitions:

Code = An (n, R) code C_n for the GP-WTC has

1) A message set: $\mathcal{M}_n \triangleq [1:2^{nR}]$

2) Encoder (stochastic): $f_n: \mathcal{M}_n \times \mathcal{S}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(X^n)$ where $\mathcal{P}(X^n)$ is the set of all probability mass functions (PMFs) over X^n .

$$P_{X|M,S} \sim \sum_{x \in X^n} P_{X|M,S}(x) \delta_{x|M,S}$$

3) Decoder $\varphi_n: Y^n \rightarrow \hat{\mathcal{M}}_n$ where $\hat{\mathcal{M}}_n = \mathcal{M}_n \cup \{e\}$ $e \notin \mathcal{M}_n$

• Induced Distribution: For any $P_M \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M}_n)$ the induced distr. by an (n, R) code

C_n is

$$P^{(C_n)}(S=s, X=x, Y=y, Z=z, \hat{M}=\hat{m}) = \underbrace{W_S^n(s)}_{P^{(S)}(s)} \underbrace{P_M(m)}_{P^{(M)}(m)} f_n(x|m, s) W_{Y,Z|X,S}^n(y, z|x, s) \mathbb{1}_{\{\hat{m}=\varphi_n(y)\}}$$

Average Error Probability: The average error probability of an (n, R) code c_n is defined as

$$e(c_n) = \frac{1}{|M_n|} \sum_{m \in M_n} e_m(c_n) \quad \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{We don't assume } P_m \text{ is uniform} \\ \text{we write this error because we} \\ \text{would like to make discussion simpler} \end{array} \right)$$

where $e_m(c_n) \triangleq P(\Psi_n(Y) \neq m | M=m)$

Semantic Security: For any (n, R) c_n and $P_m \in \mathcal{P}(M_n)$ define $l(c_n, P_m) = I_{P_m}(M; Z)$

The semantic security metric for the GP-WTC under c_n is

$$l(c_n) = \max_{P_m \in \mathcal{P}(M_n)} l(c_n, P_m)$$

Achievability: A rate R is achievable if for any $\epsilon > 0$, there exists a sequence of (n, R) codes $\{c_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ s.t. $\exists N \in \mathbb{N} \quad \forall n > N \quad e(c_n) < \epsilon \quad l(c_n) < \epsilon$

Result: Denote the semantic security capacity of the GP-WTC by C_{sem} .

and for any $q_{u,v,x|s} : S \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(U \times V \times X)$ define


$$\min \begin{cases} I(V, Y|U) - I(V, Z|U), \\ I(U, V; Y) - I(U, V; S) \end{cases}$$

where the underlying joint distribution $W_S q_{u,v,x|s} W_{Y,Z|\bar{X},S}$ ($(Y, Z) - (X, S) - (U, V)$)

A lower bound on C_{sem} is

$$C_{sem} \geq \max_{q_{u,v,x|s}} R \quad \begin{array}{l} I(U; Y) - I(U; S) \geq 0 \end{array}$$

Main Idea behind the proof: We use a superposition code construction.



- U index is a padding (decoy)
- V layer encoder padding + message
- All the secrecy comes from V .

Strong soft-covering lemma for superposition codes:

→ This is a key tool for the (both reliability and security) for our superposition coding scheme for GP-WTC.

→ Setup: Fix $q_{uv} \in \mathcal{P}(U \times V)$ and a channel $q_{w|u,v}$.

Let $B_u \triangleq \{\underline{u}(i)\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}_n}$ where $\mathcal{I}_n \triangleq [1:2^{nR_1}]$ be a collection of $|\mathcal{I}_n|$ random vectors of length n iid $\sim q_u^n$

Denote a realization of B_u by $B_u \triangleq \{\underline{u}(i)\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}_n}$

→ Fix $B_u = \{\underline{u}(i)\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}_n}$, and each $i \in \mathcal{I}_n$, let $B_v(i) = \{\underline{v}(i,j)\}_{j \in \mathcal{J}_n}$ where


$\mathcal{J}_n = [1:2^{nR_2}]$ is a random outer layer codebook with $\underline{v}(i,j) \sim \prod_{k=1}^n q_{v_k|u_k}(\cdot | u_k(i))$

indep. of all the other v -codewords

• Denoting a realization of $B_v(i)$ by $\mathcal{B}(i)$

$$P(B_u = \mathcal{B}, B_v(1) = \mathcal{B}_v(1), B_v(2) = \mathcal{B}_v(2), \dots, B_v(2^{nR_1}) = \mathcal{B}_v(2^{nR_1}))$$

model



• Induced distr.: Fixed superposition codebook B_n

$$P_w^{(B_n)}(i,j, u, v, w) = \frac{1}{|I_n|} \frac{1}{|J_n|} \mathbb{1}\{u=u(i)\} \mathbb{1}\{v=v(i,j)\} q^n_{w|u,v}(w|u, v)$$

Question: How large should R_1 and R_2 be in order to get $P_w^{(B_n)} \approx q_w^n$?

Lemma: For any coding distribution q_{uv} and $q_{w|u,v}$ where $|W| < \infty$ there exists

$\delta_1, \delta_2 > 0$ s.t. for sufficiently large n

provided that

$$R_1 > I(u; w)$$

$$R_1 + R_2 > I(u, v; w)$$

$$P_{B_n} \left(D(P_w^{(B_n)} \| q_w^n) > e^{-n\delta_1} \right) \leq e^{-e^{n\delta_2}}$$